How Russia Fills Officer Losses by Recruiting War Veterans

Recently, a growing trend has become increasingly apparent: _**Russian higher military educational institutions are actively recruiting servicemen with direct combat experience. **_It is evident that this approach is being used as a tool to build a stronger and more adaptive officer corps for the occupying army, one that differs significantly from the Soviet‑era legacy structures. This development poses a serious threat and presents the Armed Forces of Ukraine—and Ukraine as a whole—with a range of challenges that will need to be addressed in the near future.

One of the primary challenges arising from the renewal of Russia’s officer corps is the potential direct increase in the enemy’s combat effectiveness. Analysis of interviews with cadets who have prior combat experience indicates that these individuals are generally more motivated and ideologically committed than other graduates of Russian military academies. Additionally, there appears to be a deliberate strategy of “mixing” combat-experienced personnel with cadets from civilian backgrounds, increasing the likelihood that practical battlefield knowledge will be effectively transmitted throughout the officer corps.

Enemy propaganda explicitly reinforces this trend through official publications and repeated messaging in interviews with cadets following their participation in combat operations. Another critical factor is that the emergence of young officers who already possess battlefield experience prior to graduation may lead to the development of updated, refined, or even entirely new tactics and operational approaches. When a combat-experienced serviceman is promoted to an officer position, their practical experience as an executor is effectively multiplied by the command authority of a unit leader, increasing the adversary’s adaptability and unpredictability across multiple levels of warfare.

_A striking example is one individual who, while serving in a junior position, modified and enhanced the effectiveness of FPV drones._There is a strong likelihood that this expertise will be retained and multiplied after graduation and promotion to an officer rank, enabling placement in a leadership role. These factors could contribute to the formation of highly capable and influential officer groups—essentially a “military elite”—as such leaders are likely to surround themselves with other officers who have direct combat experience. This may result in the emergence of new, elite, highly organized, and disciplined informal networks within the officer corps.

There is also a risk that these individuals could advance to senior command positions, replacing ineffective or corrupt remnants of the Soviet-era hierarchy. When such combat-experienced officers assume high-level authority, adversaries could operate under the guidance of highly trained, motivated, and strategically capable personnel, presenting significant challenges to Ukraine’s military leadership.

Another critical factor is that if a combat-experienced individual has directly participated in war crimes on Ukrainian territory, this could lead to an increase in mass violations of international conventions and established rules of war, including abuse and mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilians. Specifically, an officer with such experience, when assuming a leadership position, may issue criminal orders to subordinates. Leveraging their authority and power, they could intentionally propagate unlawful methods of warfare, encourage violations of humanitarian law, and escalate violence. This significantly increases the risk of further breaches and crimes against humanity committed by their subordinates.

One illustrative case from our research is Egor Gladkikh, who was involved in the kidnapping and interrogation of a local resident. Notably, such cadets (and future officers) are easily recruited for propaganda purposes. All subjects examined in our study have been portrayed by Russian propaganda sources as exemplary patriots, formidable warriors, and role models.

In this context, the glorification of the occupiers presents a model of a successful and prestigious career to emulate, portraying a clear path for ordinary soldiers or sergeants who have distinguished themselves—both for advancement beyond the frontlines and for potential promotion to higher ranks.

International experience reinforces the points highlighted above. Prestigious and historic military academies—such as the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, the Kriegsakademie, and West Point—have, at various times, deliberately selected combat veterans. States recognized the need to bring in experienced personnel to rethink strategies and tactics, which were constantly evolving due to rapid technological advancements in warfare. Including veterans in military academies was a strategic decision, combining frontline experience with modern training and technological innovation.

Recent data reported by the Russian BBC service estimates that Russia has lost 4,338 officers in the ongoing conflict. It is important to note that these figures only include those individuals who have been identified, suggesting that actual losses could be higher.

According to pre-war statistics, a single Russian military academy typically graduated between 200 and 450 lieutenants per year. By autumn 2024, this equates to the equivalent of roughly 12 average graduating classes lost, not accounting for the fact that not all graduates are assigned to combat units or directly involved in operational duties.

The results of the research and analysis of participant feedback from this “program” can be illustrated through a specific case.

For instance, Goncharov, a former Ukrainian national now enrolled as a cadet and who deleted his profile due to participation in certain controversial groups, openly shares his impressions and experiences from the training. The most revealing insights emerge during discussions of the admission process, specifically:

-“If you passed the checkpoint at MVOKU, it meant you were admitted.”
-“Nowadays, you can enroll just by nodding at your laptop screen after opening the MVOKU website.”
-“When they were recruiting us, the only ones they didn’t take were those who voluntarily opted out. They now plan to expand recruitment even further.”
-“You can roughly gauge the level of the current cadet contingent.”
-“This kind of low standard is happening across all military academies now.”

It should also be noted that post-Soviet military academies have made little progress in overcoming entrenched Soviet-era practices, as illustrated by the following excerpts from the same chat:

-“Let me explain using an example.”
-“A colonel approaches you and starts asking about the specs of the 2A72 gun. You look at him blankly because deep down you have no idea what that weapon is—you’ve only ever seen it once on a poster. Why don’t you know? Because your class was canceled; your platoon was pulled from lessons to prepare the area for the arrival of some general’s visit— which happens quite frequently.”
-“Lately, we’ve mostly been stuck with manual labor assignments; we barely remember our instructors anymore.”

In conclusion, despite numerous obstacles and challenges, Russia is steadily moving toward the reinforcement and rebuilding of its officer corps, which has suffered significant losses since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Consequently, the Ukrainian defense sector may soon face the urgent need to enhance the training and professional development of its own officers across all levels of command. This is particularly critical as the first cohort of newly commissioned enemy officers is likely to graduate soon and be deployed to combat units, directly to the frontlines.

Junior Sergeant and Cadet Egor Gladkikh

A mobilized communications officer participated directly in the abduction of a civilian in occupied territory, as he himself admitted during an interview with a pro-Russian radio outlet. During the interview, he also openly expressed his belief in the legitimacy of his actions.

He stated:

“Many civilians think that it is the Russian side shelling itself, so to speak. It even reached the point where people told us that we were shelling ourselves to make it seem like the Ukrainian authorities, the Zelensky regime, were responsible. Many were opposed.”

Danil Goncharov, Junior Sergeant, Cadet

A Russian serviceman originally from Donetsk Oblast. His father was killed in 2022 while serving with the so-called “DPR militia.” According to information obtained from social media, he studied at a DPR-affiliated military lyceum before being deployed to serve with the Russian Naval Infantry in the Baltic region. Following the launch of the full-scale invasion, he continued his father’s path within separatist structures and became actively involved in operations against the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Sergeant, Cadet Yuriy Neiman

A figure celebrated by Russian propaganda. He has fought against the Armed Forces of Ukraine for two years, during which he actively developed new methods for deploying FPV drones and other equipment. He reportedly devised a system for using shaped-charge munitions on FPV drones. Neiman has also been awarded for “bravery” and “rescue operations,” allegedly participating in over 100 successful evacuations. He sustained a spinal injury near Kreminna and later reflected while in the hospital: “I realized I needed to keep moving forward, to acquire new knowledge and work on improving myself.”

Cadet Aleksandr Kurennoi

A native of Crimea, currently believed to be serving in the 810th Guards Marine Division, in an air defense battalion. He is studying at the Vasilyevsky Air Defense Military Academy in Smolensk and has reportedly aspired to become an officer his entire life. According to Russian propaganda, he allegedly shot down a Ukrainian Su-25, for which he was awarded the Order of Courage. Additional information about Kurennoi has been published on the official Telegram channel of the Infosprotyv.

Cadet Karim Nusratov

A former driver who reportedly intended to pursue a career in construction. He has participated in the full-scale invasion and is said to have been awarded the Zhukov Medal for rescuing fellow soldiers.

Vladimir Vasilenko, Cadet

According to Russian sources, Vasilenko is the youngest commander of an evacuation team within a Russian Marine unit. Russian propaganda claims that he captured a Ukrainian dugout and subsequently assisted 16 wounded personnel, for which he was awarded the Order of Courage. These events reportedly occurred near Severodonetsk, where he sustained injuries. He is currently a cadet at a military academy.

Authors: Angry_ded, Gansta_Panda